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1 Introduction 
With respect to uniform pricing, third-degree price discrimination generates two effects: first, 
price discrimination causes a misallocation of goods from high to low value users and, second, 
price discrimination affects total output.1 Therefore, a necessary condition for third-degree price 
discrimination to increase social welfare is an increase in total output.2 As a result, a focal point 
has been the analysis of the effects of price discrimination on output.3 It is known from Pigou 
(1920) that under linear demands price discrimination does not change output. In the general 
non-linear case, however, the effect of price discrimination on output may be either positive or 
negative. It is also well known (see, for example, Robinson, 1933, or Schmalensee, 1981) that 
when all the strong markets (markets where the optimal discriminatory price exceeds the 
optimal single price) have concave demands and the weak markets (where the optimal 
discriminatory prices are lower than the single price) have convex demands (with at least one 
market with strict concavity or convexity), then third-degree price discrimination increases 
output. When strong markets have convex demands and weak markets concave demands price 
discrimination reduces output. In the case in which all the demand curves have similar curvature 
the answer is more complicated. Shih et al. (1988) and Cheung and Wang (1994) obtain more 
general results and Aguirre (2009), Aguirre et al. (2010) and Cowan (2016) show that the effect 
of third-degree price discrimination on total output is intrinsically related to the shape of 
demands and inverse demands in strong markets as compared to the shape of direct and inverse 
demands in weak markets. 
Over the last few decades much research has analyzed price discrimination in oligopolistic 
markets both under price competition and quantity competition.4 Here we mainly focus on price 
discrimination under quantity competition following Stole’s (2007) insight: “Perhaps the 
simplest model of imperfect competition and price discrimination is the immediate extension of 
Cournot’s quantity-setting, homogeneous-good game to firms competing in distinct market 
segments.”5 The Cournot model has been widely used to analyze price discrimination in many 
different contexts.6 This paper extends the traditional analysis of the output effect under 
_________________________ 
1 See, for example, Schmalensee (1981) and Aguirre et al. (2010) for an explicit decomposition of the change in 
social welfare into these two effects: the misallocation effect and the output effect. 
2 See Schmalensee (1981), Varian (1985) and Schwartz (1990). 
3 It is assumed throughout the paper that all markets are served under both pricing policies, uniform pricing and price 
discrimination. The possibility that price discrimination opens up new markets (and that may even yield to Pareto 
improvements) has been analyzed for instance by Hausman and Mackie-Mason (1988). 
4 Many papers have analyzed oligopolistic price discrimination under price competition, including Holmes (1989), 
Corts (1998), Dastidar (2006), Adachi and Matsushima (2014), Adachi and Fabinger (2019) and Chen et al. (2019). 
5 Various empirical studies provide support for the assumption that Cournot competition prevails in some markets as, 
for instance, in the airline market, a market where price discrimination is quite common (see, for example, Brander 
and Zhang, 1990, and Oum et al., 1993). 
6 Neven and Phlips (1985), Howell (1991), Cheung and Wang (1997), Aguirre (2000), Galera and Zaratiegui (2006), 
Hazledine (2006), Stole (2007), Hazledine (2010), Kutlu (2012), Bakó and Kálecz-Simon (2012), Czerny and Zhang 
(2014), Kumar and Kutlu (2016) and Aguirre (2016) consider price discrimination under quantity competition in the 
final good market. 
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monopoly third-degree price discrimination to a multimarket oligopoly. We show that under 
symmetric Cournot oligopoly (all firms selling in all markets) similar results to those under 
monopoly are obtained:7 in order for total output to increase with price discrimination the 
demand of the strong market (the high price market) should be, as conjecture by Robinson 
(1933), more concave than the demand of the weak market (the low price one). When 
competitive pressure (measured by the number of firms) varies across markets the effect of price 
discrimination on total output crucially depends on which market, the strong or the weak, is 
more competitive. Importantly, some new unexpected results are obtained, even with linear 
demand. First, we show that price discrimination in favor of the more competitive market is 
quite generally output reducing, therefore leading to a welfare deterioration. This result 
maintains unambiguously under linear demand, and also when the strong market exhibits 
convex demand and the weak market concave demand. Our results are in line with those of 
Holmes (1989) and Weyl and Fabinger (2013) who suggest that price discrimination against the 
more competitive markets (measured by the number of firms) might reduce social welfare 
through decreasing total output. Second, when the competitive pressure is higher in the strong 
market we obtain an important result: independently of the shape of demands and inverse 
demands, price discrimination tends to increase total output. In particular, we show that even 
with linear demand price discrimination increases total output.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the output effect of price 
discrimination for a Cournot oligopoly. It shows that the results crucially depend on whether 
competitive pressure varies across markets and on which market, the strong or the weak, is more 
competitive. In Section 3, we consider an oligopoly model of price discrimination considering 
price competition and we show that our main result maintains under linear demand. That is, 
when the competitive pressure is higher in the strong market then price discrimination increases 
total output. Section 4 presents some concluding remarks. 
2 Analysis 
Consider a Cournot oligopoly selling a homogeneous product in two perfectly separated 
markets. Market 1 is served by 𝑛1 firms and market 2 by 𝑛2. The inverse demand function in 
market i is given by 𝑝𝑖(𝑞𝑖), where 𝑞𝑖 is the total quantity sold and  𝑝𝑖′(𝑞𝑖) < 0. Unit cost, c, is 
assumed constant and common for all firms. The profit function of firm j in market 𝑖 = 1,2  is 
given by: 𝜋𝑗𝑖�𝑞𝑗𝑖, 𝑞−𝑗𝑖� = [𝑝𝑖(𝑞𝑖) − 𝑐]𝑞𝑗𝑖, where 𝑞𝑗𝑖 is the quantity sold by firm j in market i 
and 𝑞−𝑗𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖 − 𝑞𝑗𝑖, which is assumed to be strictly concave. We shall obtain the change in total 
output due to a move from third-degree price discrimination to uniform pricing. 
 
_________________________ 
7 Our model of multimarket Cournot oligopoly can be seen as a particular case of multiproduct Cournot oligopoly 
(see, for instance, Johnson and Myatt, 2006). 
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Under price discrimination firms present in both markets choose their production in each 
market independently. By adding first order conditions we obtain that the equilibrium total 
output in market i satisfies:8 
𝑛𝑖�𝑝𝑖�𝑞𝑖
𝑑� − 𝑐� + 𝑞𝑖𝑑𝑝𝑖′�𝑞𝑖𝑑� = 0        𝑖 = 1,2,                                                              (1) 
where 𝑞𝑖𝑑 denotes the Cournot total output in market i.9 From condition (1) we obtain that the 
equilibrium price can be written as: 
𝑝𝑖�𝑞𝑖
𝑑� = 𝑐  1 − 1
𝑛𝑖𝜀𝑖(𝑞𝑖𝑑)       𝑖 = 1,2,                                                                               (2) 
where 𝜀𝑖(𝑞𝑖) = − 1𝑝𝑖′(𝑞𝑖) 𝑝𝑖(𝑞𝑖)𝑞𝑖  is the elasticity of demand in market 𝑖 = 1,2. Therefore, we obtain 
a generalization of the monopolistic price discrimination rule to a Cournot oligopoly: 𝑝1�𝑞1𝑑� >
𝑝2�𝑞2
𝑑� iff 𝑛1𝜀1�𝑞1𝑑� < 𝑛2𝜀2�𝑞2𝑑�. From now on, we assume that market 1 is the strong market, 
𝑝1�𝑞1
𝑑� > 𝑝2�𝑞2𝑑�. Consequently, if the number of firms does not vary across markets the 
Cournot price will be higher in the market with the lower elasticity. The total output under price 
discrimination is 𝑄𝑑 = ∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑑2𝑖=1 , which, given (1), can be expressed as: 
𝑄𝑑 = �𝑞𝑖𝑑2
𝑖=1
= −�𝑛𝑖 �𝑝𝑖�𝑞𝑖𝑑� − 𝑐�𝑝𝑖′�𝑞𝑖𝑑� .2𝑖=1                                                                             (3) 
In order to solve the problem under uniform pricing, we distinguish between firms that sell 
in both markets and firms that only sell in one market.10Assume that there are 𝑛𝐵 > 0 firms 
selling in both markets, 𝑛1 − 𝑛𝐵 > 0 firms selling only in market 1 and 𝑛2 − 𝑛𝐵 > 0 firms 
selling only in market 2. If we aggregate first order conditions for firms that are only in market i 
we get: (𝑛𝑖 − 𝑛𝐵)�𝑝𝑖�𝑞𝑖0� − 𝑐� + 𝑞𝑖𝑖0𝑝𝑖′�𝑞𝑖0� = 0        𝑖 = 1,2,                                                     (4) 
where 𝑞𝑖𝑖0  is the total output produced by firms only set in market 𝑖 = 1,2 and 𝑞𝑖0  is the total 
output sold in market 𝑖 = 1,2. Under uniform pricing a firm that sells in both markets has to 
adjust production in order to maintain the same price in both markets.11 From the first order 
conditions and by adding over firms set in both markets we get: 
_________________________ 
8 We assume that conditions for existence and uniqueness of the Cournot equilibrium are satisfied. See, for instance, 
Kolstad and Mathiesen (1987). Dastidar (2000) shows that, in a case of symmetric costs like ours, a unique Cournot 
equilibrium is always stable. 
9 Following Kreps and Sheinkman (1983) Cournot competition can be interpreted as the reduced form  of a two-stage 
game where firms first choose capacities and then set prices. Dana and Williams (2019) develop an oligopoly model 
of sequential quantity-price games where firms compete in multiple advance-purchase markets and explore the 
conditions required for intertemporal price discrimination to arise in an oligopoly setting. 
10 Uniform pricing is an empirically plausible price policy. In fact, DellaVigna and Gentzkow (2019) show that most 
U.S. food, drugstore, and mass-merchandise chains charge nearly uniform prices across stores, despite wide variation 
in consumer demographics and competition. 
11 Note that price discrimination might be illegal or impracticable due to regulation or arbitrage and the multimarket 
firms could be forced to adjust output across markets in order to satisfy price uniformity. Or, equivalently, 
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𝑛𝐵[𝑝1(𝑞10) − 𝑐]𝑝2′ (𝑞20) + 𝑛𝐵[𝑝2(𝑞20) − 𝑐]𝑝1′ (𝑞10) + (𝑞𝐵10 + 𝑞𝐵20 )𝑝1′(𝑞10)𝑝2′ (𝑞20) = 0,          (5) 
where 𝑞𝐵𝑖0  is the total output sold in market 𝑖 = 1,2 by the firms selling in both markets.12 
Condition (5) can be written as: 
𝑞𝐵1
0 + 𝑞𝐵20 = −𝑛𝐵[𝑝1(𝑞10) − 𝑐]𝑝1′ (𝑞10) − 𝑛𝐵 [𝑝2(𝑞20) − 𝑐]𝑝2′ (𝑞20) .                                                       (6) 
It is satisfied that 𝑝1�𝑞1𝑑� > 𝑝1(𝑞10) = 𝑝2(𝑞20) > 𝑝2�𝑞2𝑑� and the total output, 𝑄0 = ∑ 𝑞𝑖02𝑖=1 , 
can be expressed, given (4) and (6), as: 
𝑄0 = �𝑞𝑖02
𝑖=1
= −�𝑛𝑖 �𝑝𝑖�𝑞𝑖0� − 𝑐�𝑝𝑖′�𝑞𝑖0�2𝑖=1 .                                                                               (7) 
Given (3) and (7), the change in total output is given by: 
∆𝑄 = 𝑄𝑑 − 𝑄0 = −�𝑛𝑖 �𝑝𝑖�𝑞𝑖𝑑� − 𝑐�𝑝𝑖′�𝑞𝑖𝑑�2𝑖=1 + �𝑛𝑖 �𝑝𝑖�𝑞𝑖0� − 𝑐�𝑝𝑖′�𝑞𝑖0�2𝑖=1 ,                                 (8) 
which can be written as: 13 
∆𝑄 = −��� 𝑑 �𝑛𝑖 [𝑝𝑖(𝑞𝑖) − 𝑐]𝑝𝑖′(𝑞𝑖) �𝑞𝑖𝑑𝑞𝑖0 �2𝑖=1 .                                                                               (9) 
Therefore, the change in total output becomes: 
∆𝑄 = −�𝑛𝑖 �� [𝑝𝑖′(𝑞𝑖)]2 − [𝑝𝑖(𝑞𝑖) − 𝑐]𝑝𝑖′′(𝑞𝑖)
�𝑝𝑖
′(𝑞𝑖)�2 𝑑𝑞𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑑𝑞𝑖0 �2𝑖=1                                
∆𝑄 = −�𝑛𝑖∆2
𝑖=1
𝑞𝑖 + �𝑛𝑖 �� [𝑝𝑖(𝑞𝑖) − 𝑐]𝑝𝑖′′(𝑞𝑖)
�𝑝𝑖
′(𝑞𝑖)�2 𝑑𝑞𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑑𝑞𝑖0 �2𝑖=1 ,                              (10)  
which can be rewritten as: 
∆𝑄 = −�𝑛𝑖∆2
𝑖=1
𝑞𝑖 + �𝑛𝑖 �� 𝐿𝑖(𝑞𝑖)𝜀𝑖(𝑞𝑖)𝐶𝑖𝐼(𝑞𝑖)𝑑𝑞𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑑
𝑞𝑖
0
�
2
𝑖=1
 ,                                 (11)  
_________________________ 
multimarket firms might sign most-favored-customer (MFC) clauses with their clients committing to price uniformly 
(see, for instance, Aguirre, 2000). The argument is as follows. Assume that multimarket firm j adopts an MFC policy 
and that market 1 is strong. If firm j chooses its outputs 𝑞𝑗1 and 𝑞𝑗2 so that 𝑝1(𝑞𝑗1 + 𝑞−𝑗1) > 𝑝2(𝑞𝑗2 + 𝑞−𝑗2) then it 
must rebate �𝑝1(𝑞𝑗1 + 𝑞−𝑗1� − 𝑝2(𝑞𝑗2 + 𝑞−𝑗2)]𝑞𝑗1 to market 1 customers and therefore its profits will be [𝑝1(𝑞𝑗1 +
𝑞−𝑗1) − 𝑐]𝑞𝑗1 − �𝑝2(𝑞𝑗2 + 𝑞−𝑗2� − 𝑐]𝑞𝑗2 − �𝑝1(𝑞𝑗1 + 𝑞−𝑗1� − 𝑝2(𝑞𝑗2 + 𝑞−𝑗2)]𝑞𝑗1 = [𝑝2(𝑞𝑗2 + 𝑞−𝑗2) − 𝑐]( 𝑞𝑗1 +
𝑞𝑗2). Firm j can increase its profits by choosing an output 𝑞𝑗1′ > 𝑞𝑗1, such that given 𝑞−𝑗1, 𝑝2(𝑞𝑗2 + 𝑞−𝑗2) is the price 
of both markets obtaining [𝑝2(𝑞𝑗2 + 𝑞−𝑗2) − 𝑐]( 𝑞𝑗1′ + 𝑞𝑗2).  
12 We assume that the bordered Hessian is negative definite. 
13 We follow closely the analysis by Cheung and Wang (1994), (1997), Aguirre (2009) and Cowan (2016). 
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where 𝐿𝑖(𝑞𝑖) = 𝑝𝑖(𝑞𝑖)−𝑐𝑝𝑖(𝑞𝑖)  is the Lerner index of market i, 𝜀𝑖(𝑞𝑖) = − 1𝑝𝑖′(𝑞𝑖) 𝑝𝑖(𝑞𝑖)𝑞𝑖  is the elasticity of 
demand of market i and 𝐶𝑖𝐼(𝑞𝑖) = 𝑞𝑖 𝑝𝑖′′(𝑞𝑖)𝑝𝑖′(𝑞𝑖)  is the adjusted concavity of the inverse demand in 
market i (this is analogous to relative risk aversion for a utility function). The adjusted concavity 
of the direct demand, 𝐶𝑖𝐷(𝑞𝑖) = −𝑝𝑖(𝑞𝑖) 𝑝𝑖′′(𝑞𝑖)
�𝑝𝑖
′(𝑞𝑖)�2, is given by 𝐶𝑖𝐷(𝑞𝑖) = 𝜀𝑖(𝑞𝑖)𝐶𝑖𝐼(𝑞𝑖). Therefore, 
we can express the change in total output as: 
∆𝑄 = −�𝑛𝑖∆2
𝑖=1
𝑞𝑖 + �𝑛𝑖 �� 𝐿𝑖(𝑞𝑖)𝐶𝑖𝐷(𝑞𝑖)𝑑𝑞𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑑
𝑞𝑖
0
�
2
𝑖=1
 .                                                   (12)    
We next show that the change of total output crucially depends on whether all firms are 
present in all markets. 
 
(i) Symmetric multimarket Cournot oligopoly 
First, consider a symmetric multimarket Cournot oligopoly with all firms selling in all markets 
and, therefore, 𝑛1 = 𝑛2 = 𝑛. The change in total output is (see Cheung and Wang, 1997): 
∆𝑄 = 𝑛1 + 𝑛 �� [𝑝1(𝑞1) − 𝑐]𝑝1′′(𝑞1)[𝑝1′ (𝑞1)]2 𝑑𝑞1𝑞1𝑑𝑞10 + � [𝑝2(𝑞2) − 𝑐]𝑝2′′(𝑞2)[𝑝2′ (𝑞2)]2 𝑑𝑞2𝑞2𝑑𝑞20 � .         (13)    
One advantage of the Cournot oligopoly is that it converges to the monopoly case when 
𝑛 = 1. Under monopoly, a move from uniform pricing to third-degree price discrimination 
leads to (see, Cheung and Wang, 1994, Aguirre, 2009, or Cowan, 2016): 
∆𝑄 = 12 �� [𝑝1(𝑞1) − 𝑐]𝑝1′′(𝑞1)[𝑝1′ (𝑞1)]2 𝑑𝑞1𝑞1𝑑𝑞10 + � [𝑝2(𝑞2) − 𝑐]𝑝2′′(𝑞2)[𝑝2′ (𝑞2)]2 𝑑𝑞2𝑞2𝑑𝑞20 � .         (14)    
Therefore, we can immediately extend the results under monopoly obtained by Pigou (1920), 
Robinson (1933), Schmalense (1981), and, more recently, by Shih et al. (1988), Cheung and 
Wang (1994), Aguirre, 2009, Aguirre et al. (2010) and Cowan (2016) to a symmetric Cournot 
oligopoly. For instance, under linear demand total output changes neither in the monopoly case 
nor in the case of symmetric Cournot oligopoly independently of the number of firms (see 
Neven and Phlips, 1985, and Howell, 1991; Stole, 2007, provides a more elegant proof). On the 
other hand, third-degree price discrimination decreases output when strong markets exhibit 
strictly convex demands and weak markets have concave demands (see, for example, Robinson, 
1933, Schmalensee, 1981 or Shih et al., 1988). 
The next remark summarizes the effect of third-degree price discrimination on total output 
under monopoly and under a symmetric Cournot oligopoly.14 
 
_________________________ 
14 Weyl and Fabinger (2013) suggest that the results under monopoly might be extended to symmetric imperfect 
competition. Here, we prove it for a symmetric Cournot oligopoly. 
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Remark 1. Effect of third-degree price discrimination on total output under monopoly and 
symmetric Cournot oligopoly. 
(i) If direct demand curves and inverse demand curves are both more concave in strong markets 
than in weak markets, then third-degree price discrimination increases total output. 
(ii) If direct demand curves and inverse demand curves are both less (or equally) concave in 
strong markets than in weak markets, then third-degree price discrimination does not increase 
total output. 
With respect to the results under monopoly, see the proof of Remark 1 in Aguirre (2009) for 
the n-market case. In Aguirre et al. (2010), this result appears as a corollary of their Proposition 
4, for the two-market case. Cowan (2016) presents an elegant proof of case (i) for the n-market 
case.15 Cheung and Wang (1994) for the case of monopoly and Cheung and Wang (1997) for 
the case of Cournot oligopoly provide a weaker version of this general result. 
  
(ii) Asymmetric multimarket Cournot oligopoly 
Consider an asymmetric multimarket Cournot oligopoly with 𝑛1 ≠ 𝑛2. The effect of price 
discrimination on total output crucially depends on which market, the strong or the weak, 
exhibits more competitive pressure as measured by the number of firms. 
a) 𝑛1 < 𝑛2 
When the weak market has more firms we can rewrite (10), by adding and subtracting 
𝑛1∆𝑞2, as: 
∆𝑄 = −𝑛2 − 𝑛11 + 𝑛1 ∆𝑞2 + 11 + 𝑛1�𝑛𝑖 �� [𝑝𝑖(𝑞𝑖) − 𝑐]𝑝𝑖′′(𝑞𝑖)�𝑝𝑖′(𝑞𝑖)�2 𝑑𝑞𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑑𝑞𝑖0 � .2𝑖=1                         (15)     
As the next proposition and corollary show, when the number of firms is higher in the weak 
market the potential negative effects of price discrimination are aggravated.    
 
Proposition 1. When the weak market exhibits more competitive pressure, total output 
decreases with price discrimination under linear demand. 
 
Proof. Note that second terms in (15) are zero under linear demand, and that the first 
term is negative given that market 2 is the weak market, ∆𝑞2 > 0, and it exhibits higher 
competitive pressure, 𝑛1 < 𝑛2.∎ 
 
Corollary 1. Effect of third-degree price discrimination on total output when the weak market is 
more competitive. 
If competitive pressure, measured by the number of firms, is higher in the weak market, then 
ceteris paribus it is more likely that price discrimination will reduce total output and therefore 
social welfare. 
_________________________ 
15 See Weyl and Fabinger (2013) for a nice interpretation in terms of pass-through. 
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Proof. Note that the first term in (15) is negative given that market 2 is the weak market, 
∆𝑞2 > 0, and it exhibits higher competitive pressure, 𝑛1 < 𝑛2. Even with inverse and direct 
demands more concave in the strong market, price discrimination may reduce total output.∎ 
Given that the first term in (15) is negative, we obtain the result that total output (and, 
therefore, social welfare) may decrease regardless of the shape of inverse and direct demands 
when firms price discriminate in favor of the market with more competitive pressure. This result 
is in line with the results of Holmes (1989) and Weyl and Fabinger (2013) who suggest that 
when discrimination is in favor of individuals for whom competition is more intense, 
discrimination is more likely to be harmful. 
b) 𝑛1 > 𝑛2 
When the strong market has more firms we can rewrite (10), by adding and subtracting 
𝑛2∆𝑞1, as: 
∆𝑄 = −𝑛1 − 𝑛21 + 𝑛2 ∆𝑞1 + 11 + 𝑛2�𝑛𝑖 �� [𝑝𝑖(𝑞𝑖) − 𝑐]𝑝𝑖′′(𝑞𝑖)�𝑝𝑖′(𝑞𝑖)�2 𝑑𝑞𝑖𝑞𝑖𝑑𝑞𝑖0 � .2𝑖=1                         (16) 
Note that, regardless of the shape of demands and inverse demands, there is a tendency for 
price discrimination to increase total output given that the first term in (16) is positive. The next 
proposition and corollary present some perhaps unexpected results that stress the importance of 
the differences in competitive pressure across markets. In particular, the next proposition shows 
that what is perhaps the most cited result in Pigou (1920) and Robinson (1933) does not hold. 
 
Proposition 2. When the strong market exhibits more competitive pressure total output 
increases with price discrimination under linear demand.  
 
Proof. Note that second terms in (16) are zero under linear demand and the first term is positive 
given that market 1 is the strong market, ∆𝑞1 < 0, and it exhibits higher competitive pressure, 
𝑛1 > 𝑛2.∎ 
 
Corollary 2. Effect of third-degree price discrimination on total output when the strong market 
is more competitive.  
If competitive pressure measured by the number of firms is higher in the strong market, then, 
regardless of the shape of direct demands and inverse demands, total output can increase with 
price discrimination. 
 
Proof. Note that the first term in (16) is positive given that market 2 is the strong market, 
∆𝑞1 > 0, and it exhibits higher competitive pressure, 𝑛1 > 𝑛2. Even when inverse and direct 
demands are more concave in the weak market price discrimination might increase total 
output.∎ 
Note that when the strong market exhibits more competitive pressure, 𝑛1 > 𝑛2, the general 
result of part (i) in Remark 1 maintains: if both direct demand curves are more concave in 
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strong markets than in weak markets, then third-degree price discrimination increases total 
output. However, it is now possible that price discrimination leads to an increase in total output 
when the inverse and direct demands are not more concave in the strong markets. 
These results are in sharp contrast with the well-known results under monopoly (see, for 
instance, Pigou, 1920) and under symmetric Cournot oligopoly (see, for instance, Stole, 2007) 
that price discrimination keeps total output unchanged with linear demand. To stress the 
importance of the above result, consider the case where the strong market has a strictly convex 
inverse demand and the weak market a strictly concave one (a situation in which under 
monopoly output unambiguously decreases as graphically proved by Robinson, 1933). Note that 
given that under price discrimination output decreases in the strong market and increases in the 
weak market, the second term in condition (16) is strictly negative. However, as the first term is 
strictly positive, if |𝑝𝑖′′(𝑞𝑖)| is small enough we can find easily examples where price 
discrimination increases total output.  
We next show that similar results maintain under Bertrand competition in the case of linear 
demand. 
3 Bertrand oligopoly price discrimination and linear demand 
We consider a simple model due to Shubik and Levitan (1980) (see Motta, 2004, for a 
discussion of the advantages of this model in a context of oligopoly) to analyze the output effect 
of price discrimination under price competition.  
Consider a Bertrand oligopoly selling differentiated goods in two perfectly separated 
markets. Market 1 is served by 𝑛1 firms and market 2 by 𝑛2.16 The demand function for good j  
in market i is given by 
𝑞𝑗𝑖�𝑝𝑗𝑖 ,𝑝−𝑗𝑖� = 1𝑛𝑖 �𝑎𝑖 − 𝑝𝑗𝑖(1 + 𝜇) + 𝜇𝑛𝑖�𝑝𝑗𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑗=1 �, 
where 𝑎𝑖 > 𝑐 and 𝜇 ∈ [0,∞) represents the degree of substitutability between the 𝑛𝑖 products 
that we assume constant across markets. The profit function of firm j in market 𝑖 = 1,2  is given 
by: 𝜋𝑗𝑖�𝑝𝑗𝑖 , 𝑝−𝑗𝑖� = (𝑝𝑗𝑖 − 𝑐)𝑞𝑗𝑖�𝑝𝑗𝑖 ,𝑝−𝑗𝑖�.  
Under price discrimination firms present in both markets price their product in each market 
independently. From first order conditions and imposing symmetry we obtain the Bertrand 
equilibrium price in market 𝑖 = 1,2 as: 
𝑝𝑖
𝑑 = 𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑖 + 𝑐(𝑛𝑖 + 𝑛𝑖𝜇 − 𝜇)2𝑛𝑖 + 𝑛𝑖𝜇 − 𝜇 . 
In equilibrium, the quantity sold by firm j in market 𝑖 = 1,2 is given by: 
_________________________ 
16 Adachi and Fabinger (2019) and Chen et al. (2019) analyze the welfare effects of price discrimination considering 
a Bertrand duopoly with differentiated product allowing marginal cost to vary across markets. They also consider, 
following Holmes (1989), symmetric models with all firms selling in all markets. 
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𝑞𝑗𝑖
∗ = (𝑎𝑖 − 𝑐)(𝑛𝑖 + 𝑛𝑖𝜇 − 𝜇)
𝑛𝑖(2𝑛𝑖 + 𝑛𝑖𝜇 − 𝜇) . 
And the total output sold in market 𝑖 = 1,2 is: 
𝑞𝑖
𝑑 = (𝑎𝑖 − 𝑐)(𝑛𝑖 + 𝑛𝑖𝜇 − 𝜇)(2𝑛𝑖 + 𝑛𝑖𝜇 − 𝜇) . 
Total output under price discrimination is given by 
𝑄𝑑 = �𝑞𝑖𝑑2
𝑖=1
= �(𝑎𝑖 − 𝑝𝑖𝑑)2
𝑖=1
= � (𝑎𝑖 − 𝑐)(𝑛𝑖 + 𝑛𝑖𝜇 − 𝜇)(2𝑛𝑖 + 𝑛𝑖𝜇 − 𝜇)2𝑖=1 .                                           (17) 
In order to solve the problem under uniform pricing, we distinguish between firms that sell 
in both markets and firms that only sell in one market. Assume that there are 𝑛𝐵 > 0 firms 
selling in both markets, 𝑛1 − 𝑛𝐵 > 0 firms selling only in market 1 and 𝑛2 − 𝑛𝐵 > 0 firms 
selling only in market 2. Denote as 𝑝10, 𝑝20 and 𝑝0 equilibrium prices for firms that sell only in 
market 1, only in market 2 and in both markets, respectively,  when firms that sell in both 
markets are restricted to price uniformly. The first order condition for a firm that sells only in 
market i  is: 1
𝑛𝑖
�𝑎𝑖 − 𝑝𝑖
0(1 + 𝜇) + 𝜇
𝑛𝑖
�(𝑛𝑖 − 𝑛𝐵)𝑝𝑖0 + 𝑛𝐵𝑝0�� − �𝑝𝑖0 − 𝑐�𝑛𝑖2 [𝑛𝑖(1 + 𝜇) − 𝜇] = 0.   (18)    
From condition (17) we obtain: 
𝑝𝑖
0 = 𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑖 + 𝑐[𝑛𝑖(1 + 𝜇) − 𝜇] + 𝜇𝑛𝐵𝑝02𝑛𝑖 + 𝑛𝑖𝜇 − 𝜇 + 𝜇𝑛𝐵 , 𝑖 = 1,2                                                        (19) 
The first order condition for a firm that sells in both markets is: 1
𝑛1
�𝑎1 − 𝑝
0(1 + 𝜇) + 𝜇
𝑛1
[(𝑛1 − 𝑛𝐵)𝑝10 + 𝑛𝐵𝑝0]� − (𝑝0 − 𝑐)𝑛12 [𝑛1(1 + 𝜇) − 𝜇]   + 1
𝑛2
�𝑎2 − 𝑝
0(1 + 𝜇) + 𝜇
𝑛2
[(𝑛2 − 𝑛𝐵)𝑝20 + 𝑛𝐵𝑝0]� − (𝑝0 − 𝑐)𝑛22 [𝑛2(1 + 𝜇) − 𝜇] = 0.        (20) 
We first show that under symmetric competition (all firms selling in all markets) a move 
from uniform pricing to price discrimination does not change total output. When it is satisfied 
that 𝑛1 = 𝑛2 = 𝑛𝐵 = 𝑛, then from (19) and imposing symmetry we obtain: 
𝑝0 = (𝑎1 + 𝑎2)𝑛 + 2𝑐[𝑛(1 + 𝜇) − 𝜇]4𝑛 + 2𝑛𝜇 − 2𝜇 = 𝑝1𝑑 + 𝑝2𝑑2 .                                                              (21) 
Therefore, total output does not change:17 
_________________________ 
17 Dastidar (2006) shows, for the duopoly case, that total output can increase, decrease or remain constant, with 
linear demand, depending on the relationship between the “own effect” (𝜕𝑞𝑗𝑖/𝜕𝑝𝑗𝑖) and the “cross effect” (𝜕𝑞𝑗𝑖/
𝜕𝑝𝑘𝑖) 
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 𝑄𝑑 = �𝑞𝑖𝑑2
𝑖=1
= 𝑎1 − 𝑝𝑖𝑑 + 𝑎2 − 𝑝2𝑑 = 𝑎1 − 𝑝1𝑑 + 𝑝2𝑑2 + 𝑎2 − 𝑝1𝑑 + 𝑝2𝑑2 = �𝑞𝑖02
𝑖=1
= 𝑄0. 
The next proposition states that the results under Cournot competition can be extended to a 
product differentiation Bertrand oligopoly under linear demand.  
 
Proposition 3. Effect of third-degree price discrimination on total output for a product 
differentiation Bertrand oligopoly under linear demand. 
When the strong market exhibits more (equal/less) competitive pressure, total output increases 
(does not change/decreases) with price discrimination under linear demand. 
Proof. See Appendix. 
Therefore, differences in competitive pressure across markets are also crucial to determine 
the effect of total output under price competition and product differentiation.    
4 Concluding remarks 
The analysis of the effects of third-degree price discrimination on total output and social welfare 
has been the focus of much theoretical research beginning at least from the pioneering work by 
Pigou (1920) and Robinson (1933). This paper contributes to the literature by showing that the 
basic results under monopoly can be directly extended to a Cournot oligopoly with 
homogeneous product in the case in which all firms are established in all markets. When 
competitive pressure measured by the number of firms varies across markets we find some 
perhaps unexpected results. We have obtained that when competitive pressure is higher in the 
strong market, there is a strong tendency for price discrimination to increase total output. On the 
other hand, price discrimination tends to reduce total output when competitive pressure is higher 
in the weak market.18  
We have also found that for the two oligopoly canonical models in the literature (Bertrand 
with differentiated products and Cournot with homogeneous product), under linear demand 
price discrimination increases (does not change) (decreases) total output if the competitive 
pressure, measured by the number of firms, is greater (equal) (lower) in the strong market. 
It is well known that the effect of monopoly third-degree price discrimination on total output 
is intrinsically related to the shape of both the demands and inverse demands in strong markets 
as compared to the shape of direct and inverse demands in weak markets. We have found that, 
however, differences in competitive pressure across markets may be even more important than 
the relative demand curvatures to determine the effect on total output in the oligopoly case.  
_________________________ 
cross effect” remain constant across markets, in his model and in ours (with the same number of firms in both 
markets) total output does not change with discrimination. 
18 In a recent paper, Miklós-Thal and Shaffer (2019) obtain a related result in a context of intermediate price 
discrimination. In particular, they show that total output and social welfare are more likely to increase for more 
intense competition in the market where price rises with price discrimination (the strong market) and less intense 
competition in the market where price falls (the weak market). 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 3 
In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that marginal cost is zero, 𝑛1 > 𝑛𝐵 and 𝑛2 = 𝑛𝐵. 
When firms that sell in both markets are restricted to price uniformly, the equilibrium price for 
firms selling in both markets and the equilibrium price for firms that sell only in market 1 are, 
respectively:   
𝑝0 = (𝑎1𝑛𝐵 + 𝑎2𝑛1)𝑛1𝑛𝐵(2𝑛1 + 𝑛1𝜇 − 𝜇 + 𝜇𝑛𝐵) + 𝑎1𝜇(𝑛1 − 𝑛𝐵)𝑛1𝑛𝐵24(𝑛𝐵 + 𝑛1)𝑛12𝑛𝐵 + 𝜇𝜇 + 𝜇2𝐶  
and 
𝑝1
0 = 1(2𝑛1 + 𝑛1𝜇 − 𝜇 + 𝜇𝑛𝐵)[4(𝑛𝐵 + 𝑛1)𝑛12𝑛𝐵 + 𝜇𝜇 + 𝜇2𝐶] {𝑎1𝑛1[4(𝑛𝐵 + 𝑛1)𝑛12𝑛𝐵 + 𝜇𝜇+ 𝜇2𝐶] + 𝜇(𝑎1𝑛𝐵 + 𝑎2𝑛1)𝑛1𝑛𝐵2(2𝑛1 + 𝑛1𝜇 − 𝜇 + 𝜇𝑛𝐵)+ 𝑎1𝜇2(𝑛1 − 𝑛𝐵)𝑛1𝑛𝐵3}, 
where   
𝜇 = 8𝑛12𝑛𝐵2 + 4𝑛13𝑛𝐵 − 4𝑛1𝑛𝐵2 − 2𝑛13 − 2𝑛12𝑛𝐵 
𝐶 = 3𝑛12𝑛𝐵2 + 𝑛13𝑛𝐵 − 3𝑛1𝑛𝐵2 − 𝑛13 − 2𝑛12𝑛𝐵 + 𝑛𝐵2 + 𝑛12. 
Total output in market 1 and market 2, under uniform pricing, are, respectively:  
𝑄1
0 = 𝑎1 − 𝑝10 (𝑛1 − 𝑛𝐵)𝑛1 − 𝑝0 𝑛𝐵𝑛1  
and 
𝑄2
0 = 𝑎2 − 𝑝0. 
The changes in prices due to a movement from uniform pricing to price discrimination are: 
∆𝑝11 = 𝑝1𝑑 − 𝑝10 (the change in the price for firms that only sell in market 1), ∆𝑝𝐵1 = 𝑝1𝑑 − 𝑝0 
(the change in their market 1’s price for firms that sell in both markets), and ∆𝑝2 = 𝑝2𝑑 − 𝑝0 
(the change in their market 2’s price for firms that sell in both markets).    
The change in total output due to a move from uniform pricing to third-degree price 
discrimination is: 
∆𝑄 = − (𝑛1 − 𝑛𝐵)
𝑛1
∆𝑝11 −
𝑛𝐵
𝑛1
∆𝑝𝐵1 − ∆𝑝2. 
If the market with more firms, market 1, is the strong market, 𝑝1𝑑 > 𝑝2𝑑, then price 
discrimination increases total output. If the market with more firms is the weak market, 
𝑝1
𝑑 < 𝑝2𝑑, then price discrimination reduces total output.   
Therefore, when the strong market exhibits more (equal/less) competitive pressure, total 
output increases (does not change/decreases) with price discrimination under linear demand.∎ 
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